This is a story of a father, Christopher Robin, who has not seen his son for 570 days. The reason for this is that the "loving, caring " Mother has stopped all contact between father and son.

Unfortunately for the Mother and the State of California they have decided to "go against" the wrong type of Person and Father. This father is a fighter, this father, as you will read, was blissfully naive, just like all the other fathers untill one day the "BOMB" hits them either in Court or as on most occassions, when the front door is slammed in their faces when they go to pick up their kids for Samvær. A Samvær which the Father and the Kids are entitled to by natural means and a Samvær which they are entitled to by Law, but which is refused to them by the "loving caring" Mother.

NOTE.

For those of U interested in Law and in the US. There is no big difference

between here and over there.

Petition to The Court. Original Plea.

This I am working on and will be up and running ASAP.

Please, everybody be PATIENT,

Thanks Gordon ( 1st November 1997)

Start Plea. Note for GW-G

Christopher Robin, Plaintiff

VS. CASE NUMBER

CV 96-8915

Defendants

THIS PLACE WILL HAVE THE PLEA \ PETITION.

End Plea. Note for GW-G.

E-mail. 23.09.97

Fellow Fathers in Exile, Friends, Activists,

Since so many of you have indicated interest in what is happening in our Federal lawsuit, it is alive and well, we are working hard at getting all i's dotted and t's crossed.

The following is a rough draft of our latest brief in our Federal Civil Rights lawsuit. It is nearly ready to mail to the 28 defendants. Our court date is set for October 27, 1997. Before that date in Federal court, we plan to bombard the media world with a press kit informing them about the ongoing battle for justice for families in Anti-family courts.

We not completed the front page or the table of contents to this Motion but it is ready for your perusal. When it is completed, you may find the final product on our website below.

Thanks for your good wishes and prayers.

c.r.

Christopher Robin, Plaintiff in Propria Persona

Christopher Robin, Plaintiff

VS. CASE NUMBER

CV 96-8915

The Superior Court of the State of California in and for

the County of Los Angeles; the County of Los Angeles;

William A. Allen, Judge Pro Tem of the Superior in and for

the County of Los Angeles, in his official capacity

and individually; Robert L. Schibel, Esq., an individual;

Defendants

CASE NUMBER

CV 96-8915 HLH (SH)

Opposition to Motion to Dismiss

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion FRCP 12(A) (2);

Request to remove County Counsel to State Employees;

Request to remove Defendant Robert L. Schibel as attorney for co-defendant Brandy Robin

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

OPPOSITION TO MOTION AND MEMORANDUM ETC.........

_______________________________________________________

Christopher Robin, Plaintiff, in Propera Persona

__________________________________________

Plaintiff hereby opposes the Motion to Dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction in that the Federal Court is the only court that has jurisdiction over Constitutional issues. Plaintiff has stated fully a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff also requests that the County Counsel remove themselves as counsel for any of the named defendants, as the defendants themselves say they are employees of the State and not of the County, and that a proper substitution of attorney's be submitted to the court and to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff also requests that the Motion to Dismiss by the County Counsel be dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction for the County to be representing employees of the State. Plaintiff no less responds to the motion to further his complaint, but in no such way waives his right to have the County Counsel dismissed.

Plaintiff requests that Defendant Robert L. Schibel remove himself as Counsel for co-defendant Brandy Robin, as this is a conflict of interest, and can compromise the integrity of the case.

Said motion will be based upon this Opposition to Motion and attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Wherefore, it is prayed that :

1) The Verified Complaint be heard in court by a Jury as Demanded in the original Verified Complaint;

2) the complaint be not dismissed

3) for other such relief as the court may deem proper

Dated: 19

Christopher Robin, in Pro Per

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Summary of the Case.

Plaintiff in Pro Se alleges that on or about December 29, 1995, Defendant Commissioner Allen illegally issued a restraining order, enjoining him from the free speech granted to him by the Bill of Rights. Plaintiff was not Served Notice in Person as required by the Code of Civil Procedure 1010 et seq. Plaintiff also alleges that through the transcripts acquired through the courts, that Robert L. Schibel and Commissioner Allen engaged in ex-Parte communications to secure the Unconstitutional gag order ( reporters transcripts page 1 line 25 to page 2, line 2. dated 12/29/95, 9:30 am) Ex-parte communications are barred by the Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-500. There is also no mention on the record as to whether or not the Respondent Christopher Robin was properly served and there is no evidence on record that Mr. Robin was present in court to offer a defense. In the Order after Hearing, Comnmissioner Allen stamped the order which stated, "Respondent was present in pro per", when in fact, Christopher Robin, a singing teacher, was not aware there was a hearing and was teaching at the time of the hearing. It is also the Plaintiff's understanding that gag orders are issued only in limited instances, and as such must be definite in giving a reason for such an order. The order as issued by the court is vague and gives no reason for its issue. Had there been a valid reason for the Plaintiff to not exercise his free speech rights, the Defendant Brandy Robin, would have had other means of civil redress.

Plaintiff further alleges that Commissioner Allen Unconstitutionally conditioned his visits with his son upon payment of a court approved monitor for the visits, despite evidence that the son had been systematically abused both mentally and physically by the mother. Plaintiff alleges that such deprivation of his rights as a parent violate his State and Federal Constitutional rights in particular the Fourteenth Amendment. Commissioner Allen was clearly outside his jurisdiction when he ordered supervised visitation, when the law dictates such visitation only in a narrow spectrum of cases. The Family code specifically States that absent a showing to the detriment of the child, such as a child abuse conviction, supervised visitation CANNOT be granted. (Family code 3030 et Seq). As Stated in the Eleventh Amendment, when a county official acts outside the law in willful disregard of the law and civil rights of the of the person before him, he is not immune from liability. Officials exercising discretion are entitled only to the qualified immunity specified in Scheuer, subject to those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of public business. [T]here is no substantial basis for holding that executive officers generally may with impunity discharge their duties in a way that is known to them to violate the Constitution, or in a manner that they should know transgresses a clearly Constitutional rule. Butz v. Economou 438 US 478; Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918); Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547 (1918); Scheuer v. Rhodes,416 U.S. 233 (1974).

The County States that the most fundamental problem with the action is a United States District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the rulings of State court judges. Counsel has this wrong. The Plaintiff is seeking redress for the UnConstitutional behavior *NOT* barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Whether or not 42 USC 1983 has been recently amended barring injunctive relief against judges, it remains to be seen if it holds Constitutional waters. Granted, judges are quite prone to lawsuits deriving from unfavorable decisions. But what the Plaintiff seeking redress for, is the blatant disregard for the Constitution and the rights of the Plaintiff. Judges are not covered by qualified immunity if they knowingly and willfully disregard the rights of an individual before them. The Constitution makes no exceptions to this rule. Since the early resolutions of the Constitution, suits against the State are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but suit against its agents are not. Mitigation of the wrongs possible when the State is immune from suit has been achieved under the doctrine that sovereign immunity, either of the States or the Federal Government, does not ordinarily prevent a suit against an official to restrain him from a commission of a wrong, even though the government is thereby restrained. See e.g., Larson v. domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 US 682 (1949), where the majority and dissenting opinion utilize both Federal and Eleventh Amendment cases in a suit against a Federal official. See also Tindale v. Wesley, 167 US 204 (1897), applying to the States the Federal rule of the United States v. Lee, 106 US 196 (1882).

II

A DISTRICT COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO CONDUCT A DIRECT REVIEW OF STATE COURT JUDGMENTS

Opposing counsel claims that Plaintiff asks this court to invalidate and enjoin orders in a State court family law proceeding. They cite Worldwide Church of God v. McNair (9th Cir 1986) 805 F.2d 888; and Al Hakim Allah v. Superior Court (9th Cir. 1989 871 F.2d 887. In Both cases, the parties ask for specific remedies of the Federal Court in State judgments of finality. In Worldwide, the church asked the Federal court to review State court decisions sustaining the receivership or discovery orders relating to the State litigation. Since the action was that of a State statute, all State remedies must be exhausted before making a challenge in Federal court. Huffmann v. Pursue Ltd., 429 US 592, 95 S. Ct. 1200 (1975). Almost the identical can be said for Allah, to the extent that Allah requested the district court to conduct a direct review of the State court's judgement and to scrutinize the State court's application of various rules and procedures pertaining to his case. 28 UCS 1257 states that a proper venue for challenging the validity of a treaty or statute... is throughout the highest court of a State.

Plaintiff does not allege any specific statute or treaty repugnant to the Constitution, that requires exhausting all State remedies, but alleges that through the misconduct of Commissioner Allen, and therein alleges conspiracy within the family court system, that Due Process rights of predominantly fathers are routinely violated, although statutes to prevent this to some degree are in place.

Plaintiff alleges that he has routinely been subjected to humiliation and degradation, as well as illegal ex-parte gag orders contrary to the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, the Fourteenth Amendment states that [w]hen the Constitution requires a hearing it, requires a fair one, held before a tribunal which meets currently prevailing standards of impartiality Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 US 33(1950). A party must be given an opportunity not only to present evidence, but also to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. Plaintiff alleges that even though laws are in place, judges routinely ignore them to meet their own agendas, then hide behind the cloak of judicial immunity to protect them from their illegal acts.

The Motion to Dismiss (pg. 3 line 4) patently misstates the Eleventh Amendment. In actuality it reads " The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in lawa or Equity, commenced and prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by subjects of any Foreign State."

The Motion also comes to the erroneous conclusion that a suit against the Superior Court is a de facto suit against the State. It has also been held by the Eleventh Amendment that any State Official or Agency acting outside the Statute, is not covered by unlimited immunity. Johnson v. Langford supra; Sheuer v. Rhodes supra. Even in the Motion to Dismiss, counsel defeats its own purpose by stating on page 4, line 11, "a judge is not immune from actions though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." The same applies for the judges of the superior court acting either in concert or alone.

With respect to governmental entities that derive their authority from the State, but are not the State, there Court closely examines the State law to determine what the nature of the entity is. An arm of the State has immunity: "Agencies exercising State power have been permitted to invoke the amendment in order to protect the State treasury from liability that would have essentially the same practical consequence as a judgement against the State itself." Lake County Estaes v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 US 391.

Plaintiff in no way intends to bankrupt the State, but is permitted under Federal law to seek redress for violation of his Constitutional rights. [T]he decision in Bivens established that a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a Constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general Federal question jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary damages against the responsible officials. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971).

III

THE COUNTY IS NOT THE JUDGE'S EMPLOYER; EVEN IF IT WERE, IT CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE ON THE THEORY OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR.

Since the county is not the judge's employer, Plaintiff requests that County Counsel remove himself as counsel, since he is not counsel for the State nor its employees.

Here again, Plaintiff must deliver the same argument, that any State official, acting under color of law, who willfully and knowingly deprives a person of their rights, is subject to liability. Further, the rights at stake in a suit brought directly under the Bill of Rights are no less worthy of full protection than the Constitutional and statutory rights protected by Section 1983. Butz v. Economou 438 US 478; Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918); Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547 (1918); Scheuer v. Rhodes,416 U.S. 233 (1974).

IV

The commissioner is Absolutely Immune from Liability.

The Defense counsel raises the issue that judicial immunity is well grounded in Federal common law. What the defense fails to point out is that the Federal government itself is protected, and the States are protected by foreign nationals suing another State. This of course comes into serious question as illegal aliens are pursuing actions in Federal court to remain here in the United States and have brought injections via the ACLU in Federal court to ensure their "rights."

In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,[22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)] the Court, again through Chief Justice Marshall, held that the Bank of the United States was treated as if it were a private citizen, rather than as the United States itself, and hence a suit by it was a diversity suit by a corporation, as if it were a suit by the individual shareholders. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 61 (1809)] could sue the Treasurer of Ohio, over Eleventh Amendment objections, because the plaintiff sought relief against a State officer rather than against the State itself. This ruling embodied two principles, one of which has survived and one of which the Marshall Court itself soon abandoned. The latter holding was that a suit is not one against a State unless the State is a named party of record. A State official possesses no official capacity when acting illegally and thus can derive no protection from an UnConstitutional statute of a State.[9 Wheat. at 858-59, 868. For the flowering of the principle, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)]

The opposing counsel has offered no cites other than alleged recent amendments to support their claims. This Plaintiff has resorted to earlier citations since the more recent decisions have deviated from the original legislative intent of the Eleventh Amendment.

.

IV(a)

Suits Against State Officials

Mitigation of the wrongs possible when the State is immune from suit has been achieved under the doctrine that sovereign immunity, either of the States or of the Federal Government, does not ordinarily prevent a suit against an official to restrain him from commission of a wrong, even though the government is thereby restrained. [See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949)].

The immunity of a State from suit has long been held not to extend to actions against State officials for damages arising out of willful and negligent disregard of State laws.[Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918); Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547 (1918)]. The reach of the rule is evident in Scheuer v. Rhodes,416 U.S. 233 (1974) in which the Court held that plaintiffs were not barred by the Eleventh Amendment or other immunity doctrines from suing the governor and other officials of a State alleging that they deprived plaintiffs of Federal rights under color of State law and seeking damages, when it was clear that plaintiffs were seeking to impose individual and personal liability on the officials. There was no ``executive immunity'' from suit, the Court held; rather, the immunity of State officials is qualified and varies according to the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the particular office and the circumstances existing at the time the challenged action was taken. [These suits, like suits against local officials and municipal corporations, are typically brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and typically involve all the decisions respecting liability and immunities thereunder. On the scope of immunity of Federal officials].

V

CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Counsel is quite in error . The original complaint was filed on December 19, 1996, not in 1985. An extension was granted by Federal Magistrate Judge Hillman to extend the time limitations for the service of summons to September 10, 1996.

VI

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Opposing counsel states that there is no basis for injunctive relief since Plaintiff failed to seek appellate review or other State extraordinary relief. The appellate courts only review the technicality of the trial conducted, but do not have the jurisdiction to rule on Federal Constitutional issues. Had the plaintiff moved through the appellate courts, the only relief he could hope for would be a remand back to court, and since the Plaintiff is alleging a conspiracy within the family courts to deprive him of his Due Process Rights, no relief would be possible.

Counsel again argues that the Plaintiff is asking the Federal Court to enjoin in the present family court proceedings. Again, counsel has this wrong. Plaintiff is seeking redress for violation of his Constitutional rights and not to enjoin the ongoing proceedings. The Defendants in this matter are alleged to have violated Federal law, and therefore come under Federal jurisdiction.

Since there are no bars to a violation of the Plaintiff's Civil Rights, the opposition quoting Ex-Parte Fahey, supra, Plaintiff IS alleging "one of those really extraordinary causes" for which rare equitable relief directed at a State court judge is reserved.

County counsel claims that Plaintiff cannot state facts upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff HAS stated facts, all of which are supported by evidence.

VII

SUMMARY

Plaintiff seeks Federal redress for the wrongs perpetrated against him in State Superior Court. Federal Claims are not barred in this instance, as he is not contesting the Constitutionality of any State law, but is raising issue with the Unconstitutional actions of those sworn to uphold the Constitution. Not to mention the deprivation of the Plaintiff's Due Process rights that were circumvented during the proceedings.

To invoke the privilege of absolute immunity invites judges to make rulings that fit their agenda. Since the majority of those in the court system can barely raise the retainer fees of the attorneys to fight a greatly contested case, they most certainly cannot raise the funds to appeal any Unconstitutional rulings a judge may make, as is routinely done in Family Court.

For the foregoing reasons this complaint should not be dismissed

Plaintiff Christopher Robin hereby opposes the Motion to Dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction in that the Federal Court is the only court that has jurisdiction over Constitutional issues. Plaintiff has stated fully a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff Christopher Robin also requests that the County Counsel remove themselves as counsel for any of the named defendants, as the defendants themselves say they are employees of the State and not of the County, and that a proper substitution of attorney's be submitted to the court and to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff also requests that the Motion to Dismiss by the County Counsel be dismissed based on lack of jurisdiction for the County to be representing employees of the State. Plaintiff no less responds to the motion to further his complaint, but in no such way waives his right to have the County Counsel dismissed.

Plaintiff requests that Defendant Robert L. Schibel remove himself as Counsel for co-defendant Brandy Robin, as this is a conflict of interest, and can compromise the integrity of the case.

Said motion will be based upon this Opposition to Motion and attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

Wherefore, it is prayed that :

________________________________________________________________________________

Christopher Robin, in Propera Persona

Dated: September 30, 1997

Plaintiff in Pro Se alleges that on or about December 29, 1995, Defendant Commissioner Allen illegally issued a restraining order, enjoining him from the free speech granted to him by the Bill of Rights. Plaintiff was not Served Notice in Person as required by the Code of Civil Procedure 1010 et seq. Plaintiff also alleges that through the transcripts acquired through the courts, that Defendant Robert L. Schibel and Defendant Commissioner Allen engaged in ex-Parte communications to secure the Unconstitutional gag order (reporters transcripts page 1 line 25 to page 2, line 2. dated 12/29/95, 9:30 am) Ex-parte communications are barred by the Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-500. There is also no mention on the record as to whether or not the Respondent Christopher Robin was properly served and there is no evidence on record that Mr. Robin was present in court to offer a defense. In the Order after Hearing, Defendant Commissioner Allen stamped the order which stated, "Respondent was present in pro per", when in fact, Christopher Robin, a singing teacher, was not aware there was a hearing and was teaching at the time of the hearing. It is evident in the Order After Hearing written on Defendant Schibel pleading paper and stamped by Defendant Commissioner Allen, there had been secret communications previous to the hearing between those Defendants without Plaintiff Christopher Robin ever being notified or aware of those meetings or communications.

It is also the Plaintiff’s understanding that gag orders are issued only in limited instances, and as such must be definite in giving a reason for such an order. The order as issued by the court is vague and gives no reason for its issue. Had there been a valid reason for the Plaintiff to not exercise his free speech rights, the Defendant Brandy Robin, would have had other means of civil redress.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Commissioner Allen unconstitutionally conditioned his visits with his son upon payment of a court approved monitor for the visits, despite evidence that the son had been systematically abused both mentally and physically by the mother. Plaintiff Christopher Robin alleges that such deprivation of his rights as a parent, violate his State and Federal Constitutional rights in particular the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant Commissioner Allen was clearly outside his jurisdiction when he ordered supervised visitation, when the law dictates such visitation only in a narrow spectrum of cases.

The Family code specifically States that absent a showing to the detriment of the child, such as a child abuse conviction, supervised visitation CANNOT be granted. (Family code 3030 et Seq). As Stated in the Eleventh Amendment, 12, when a county official acts outside the law in willful disregard of the law and civil rights of the of the person before him, he is not immune from liability. Officials exercising discretion are entitled only to the qualified immunity specified in Scheuer, subject to those exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute immunity is essential for the conduct of public business. There is no substantial basis for holding that executive officers generally may, with impunity, discharge their duties in a way that is known to them to violate the Constitution, or in a manner that they should know transgresses a clearly Constitutional rule. Butz v. Economou 438 US 478 3; Johnson v. Lankford 245 U.S. 541, (1918) 3; Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547 (1918) 3; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 233 (1974) 3.

The County states that the most fundamental problem with the action is that a United States District Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the rulings of State court judges. Counsel has this wrong. The Plaintiff is seeking redress for the unconstitutional behavior *NOT* barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Whether or not 42 USC 1983 has been recently amended barring injunctive relief against judges, it remains to be seen if it holds Constitutional waters. Granted, judges are quite prone to lawsuits deriving from unfavorable decisions. But what the Plaintiff seeking redress for, is the blatant disregard for the Constitution and the rights of the Plaintiff. Judges are not covered by qualified immunity if they knowingly and willfully disregard the rights of an individual before them. The Constitution makes no exceptions to this rule. Since the early resolutions of the Constitution, suits against the State are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, but suit against its agents are not. Mitigation of the wrongs possible when the State is immune from suit has been achieved under the doctrine that sovereign immunity, either of the States or the Federal Government, does not ordinarily prevent a suit against an official to restrain him from a commission of a wrong, even though the government is thereby restrained. See e.g., Larson v. domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 US 682 (1949) 4, where the majority and dissenting opinion utilize both Federal and Eleventh Amendment cases in a suit against a Federal official. See also Tindale v. Wesley, 167 US 204 (1897) 4, applying to the States the Federal rule of the United States v. Lee, 106 US 196 (1882) 4.

II

Opposing counsel claims that Plaintiff asks this court to invalidate and enjoin orders in a State court family law proceeding. They cite Worldwide Church of God v. McNair (9th Cir 1986) 805 F. 2d 888 5; and Al Hakim Allah v. Superior Court (9th Cir. 1989) 871 F. 2d 887 5. In Both cases, the parties ask for specific remedies of the Federal Court in State judgments of finality. In Worldwide, the church asked the Federal court to review State court decisions sustaining the receivership or discovery orders relating to the State litigation. Since the action was that of a State statute, all State remedies must be exhausted before making a challenge in Federal court. Huffmann v. Pursue Ltd., 429 US 592, 95 S. Ct. 1200 (1975) 5. Almost the identical can be said for Allah, to the extent that Allah requested the district court to conduct a direct review of the State court's judgement and to scrutinize the State court's application of various rules and procedures pertaining to his case. 28 UCS 1257 states that a proper venue for challenging the validity of a treaty or statute... is throughout the highest court of a State.

Plaintiff does not allege any specific statute or treaty repugnant to the Constitution, that requires exhausting all State remedies, but alleges that through the misconduct of Defendant Commissioner Allen, and therein alleges conspiracy within the family court system, that Due Process rights of predominantly fathers are routinely violated, although statutes to prevent this to some degree are in place.

Plaintiff Christopher Robin alleges that he has routinely been subjected to humiliation and degradation, as well as illegal ex-parte gag orders contrary to the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, the Fourteenth Amendment states that when the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, held before a tribunal which meets currently prevailing standards of impartiality Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 US 33 (1950) 5. A party must be given an opportunity not only to present evidence, but also to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. Plaintiff alleges that even though laws are in place, judges routinely ignore them to meet their own agendas, then hide behind the cloak of judicial immunity to protect them from their illegal acts.

The Motion to Dismiss (pg. 3 line 4) patently misstates the Eleventh Amendment. In actuality it reads " The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or Equity, commenced and prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by subjects of any Foreign State."

The Motion also comes to the erroneous conclusion that a suit against the Superior Court is a de facto suit against the State. It has also been held by the Eleventh Amendment that any State Official or Agency acting outside the Statute, is not covered by unlimited immunity. Johnson v. Langford supra; Sheuer v. Rhodes supra. Even in the Motion to Dismiss, counsel defeats its own purpose by stating on page 4, line 11, "a judge is not immune from actions though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." The same applies for the Judges of the Superior Court, acting either in concert or alone.

With respect to governmental entities that derive their authority from the State, but are not the State, there Court closely examines the State law to determine what the nature of the entity is. An arm of the State has immunity: "Agencies exercising State power have been permitted to invoke the amendment in order to protect the State treasury from liability that would have essentially the same practical consequence as a judgement against the State itself." (Lake County Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 US 3 7 . )

Plaintiff in no way intends to bankrupt the State, but is permitted under Federal law to seek redress for violation of his Constitutional rights. The decision in Bivens established that a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a Constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general Federal question jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary damages against the responsible officials. (Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 403 US 388 (1971) 7.

Here again, Petitioner must deliver the same argument, that any state official, acting under color of law, who willfully and knowingly deprives a person of their rights, is subject to liability. Further, the rights at stake in a suit brought directly under the bill of rights are no less worthy of full protection than the constitutional and statutory rights protected by Section 1983. Butz v. Economou; Johnson v. Lankford, (1918); Martin v. Lankford, (1918); Scheuer v. Rhodes, (1974). County counsel argues that the county is not the judges employer. Plaintiff argues otherwise. Judges are not always appointed to the bench, but elected by the people of the county, and therefore are servants of the people that elected them to the bench. The county further argues that even if it were, then they cannot be held liable under respondeat superior, citing Monell v. New York City Dept of Social Services (1978) 436 US 6 8. This was overruled in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 US 6 8, where the court held that a municipality has no immunity from liability under Section 1983 flowing from its constitutional violations, and may not assert the good faith of its officers as a defense to such liability..

By its terms, Section 1983 creates a species of tort liability that, on its face, admits of "no immunities". (Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 US 409 8 ). Its language is absolute and unqualified, and no mention is made of any privileges, immunities or defenses that may be asserted.

Rejection of a construction of Section 1983 that would accord municipalities a qualified immunity for their good faith constitutional violations is compelled both by the purpose of Section 1983 to provide protection to those persons wronged by the abuse of governmental authority and to deter future constitutional violations, and by considerations of public policy. In view of the qualified immunity enjoyed by most government officials, many victims of municipal malfeasance would be left remedyless if the city were also allowed a good faith defense..

This argument is supported as well in Howlet v. Rose, 496 US 356 (1990) 9, where it was

held that since the Court has held that municipal corporations and similar governmental entities are

persons, see Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, (1978);

Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 US 274 9 (1977), a state court entertaining a 1983 action must adhere to that interpretation. Municipal defenses - including an assertion of sovereign immunity - to a Federal right of action are, of course, controlled by Federal law. (Owen v. City of Independence) By including municipalities within the class of persons subject to liability for violations of the Federal Constitution and laws, Congress - the supreme sovereign on matters of Federal law - abolished whatever vestige of the States sovereign immunity the municipality possessed.

The Defense counsel raises the issue that judicial immunity is well grounded in federal common law. What the defense fails to point out is that the federal government itself is protected, and the states

are protected by foreign nationals suing another state. This of course comes into serious question as illegal aliens are pursuing actions in federal court to remain here in the United States and have brought injunctions via the ACLU in federal court to ensure their rights.

In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 US (9 Wheat) 738 (1824), the Court, again through Chief Justice Marshall, held that the Bank of the United States was treated as if it were a private citizen, rather than as the United States itself, and hence a suit by it was a diversity suit by a corporation, as if it were a suit by the individual shareholders of the Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 61 (1809) 10, could sue the Treasurer of Ohio, over Eleventh Amendment objections, because the plaintiff sought relief against a state officer rather than against the State itself. This ruling embodied two principles, one of which has survived and one of which the Marshall Court itself soon abandoned. The latter holding was that a suit is not one against a State unless the State is a named party of record. A state official possesses no official capacity when acting illegally and thus can derive no protection from an unconstitutional statute of a State. For the flowering of the principle, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) 11.

It was held in Howlet v. Rose, supra, that if we were to uphold the immunity claim in this case, every State would have the same opportunity to extend the mantle of sovereign immunity to who would otherwise be subject to 1983 liability.. States would then be free to nullify for their own people the legislative decisions that Congress has made on behalf of all the People..

IV(a)

SUITS AGAINST STATE OFFICIALS

Mitigation of the wrongs possible when the State is immune from suit has been achieved under the doctrine that sovereign immunity, either of the States or of the Federal Government, does not ordinarily prevent a suit against an official to restrain him from commission of a wrong, even though the government is thereby restrained. [ Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., (1949)].

The immunity of a State from suit has long been held not to extend to actions against State officials for damages arising out of willful and negligent disregard of State laws. [Johnson v. Lankford, (1918); Martin v. Lankford, (1918)]. The reach of the rule is evident in Scheuer v. Rhodes, (1974) in which the Court held that plaintiffs were not barred by the Eleventh Amendment or other immunity doctrines from suing the governor and other officials of a State alleging that they deprived plaintiffs of Federal rights under color of State law and seeking damages, when it was clear that plaintiffs were seeking to impose individual and personal liability on the officials. There was no ``executive immunity'' from suit, the Court held; rather, the immunity of State officials is qualified and varies according to the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the particular office and the circumstances existing at the time the challenged action was taken. [These suits, like suits against local officials and municipal corporations, are typically brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and typically involve all the decisions respecting liability and immunities thereunder. On the scope of immunity of Federal officials].

Counsel is quite in error . The original complaint was filed on December 19, 1996, not in 1985. An extension was granted by Federal Magistrate Judge Hillman to extend the time limitations for the service of summons to September 10, 1996.

VI

THERE IS NO BASIS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Opposing counsel states that there is no basis for injunctive relief since Plaintiff failed to seek appellate review or other State extraordinary relief. The appellate courts only review the technicality of the trial conducted, but do not have the jurisdiction to rule on Federal Constitutional issues.

Had the plaintiff moved through the appellate courts, the only relief he could hope for would be a remand back to court, and since the Plaintiff is alleging a conspiracy within the family courts to deprive him of his Due Process Rights, no relief would be possible.

Counsel again argues that the Plaintiff is asking the Federal Court to enjoin in the present family court proceedings. Again, counsel has this wrong. Plaintiff is seeking redress for violation of his Constitutional rights and not to enjoin the ongoing proceedings. The Defendants in this matter are alleged to have violated Federal law, and therefore come under Federal jurisdiction.

Since there are no bars to a violation of the Plaintiff’s Civil Rights, the opposition quoting Ex-Parte Fahey, cite, Plaintiff is alleging "one of those really extraordinary causes" for which rare equitable relief directed at a State court judge is reserved.

County counsel claims that Plaintiff cannot state facts upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff HAS stated facts, all of which are supported by evidence.

Plaintiff Christopher Robin seeks Federal redress for the wrongs perpetrated against him in State Superior Court. Federal Claims are not barred in this instance, as he is not contesting the constitutionality of any state law, but is raising issue with the unconstitutional actions of those sworn to uphold the constitution. Not to mention the deprivation of the Plaintiffs rights that were circumvented during the proceedings..

To invoke the privilege of absolute immunity invites judges to make rulings that fit their agenda. since the majority of those in the court system, such as the petitioner, can barely raise the retainer

fees of the attorneys to fight a greatly contested case, they most certainly cannot raise the funds to appeal..

Immunity is an issue whose time has come as disgruntled Americans are questioning what is happening behind the cloak of immunity. The credibility of our justice system is at stake, and when the system responds by defending its errors instead of correcting them, the publics anger becomes justifiable: an error isn’t a failure or mistake, _unless_ you refuse to correct it..

The reasons for immunity have seemed good, having served to protect the innocent errors of prosecutors who worked in our (public) behalf to advocate for victims, and the criminals who are a threat to us all. Unfortunately, that is tarnished when immunity is used to cover situations it was never meant to protect: exculpatory material which should rightly be used by defendants; fabrication or enhancement of evidence; and the many other classes of arguably known wrong-doings..

The judiciary of this country is more and more viewed as a self-affirming body, not accountable to the people it represents. In order for this perception to change, the system must adhere to the most rigorous standards for itself. The judiciary system is our equivalent to the British Royalty exempt from accountability. Unlike Britain, however, the public is calling its Royalty to account.. Better that it police itself with honesty and honor than that it be called to account by a mutinous populace..

For the foregoing reason this complaint should not be dismissed.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983

Al Hakim Allah v. Superior Court (9th Cir. 1989 871 F.2d 887 5

Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 61 (1809) 10

Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 403 US 388 (1971) 7

Butz v. Economou 438 US 478 3

Eleventh Amendment 12

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) 11

Howlet v. Rose, 496 US 356 (1990) 9

Huffmann v. Pursue Ltd., 429 US 592, 95 S. Ct. 1200 (1975) 5

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 US 409 8

Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918) 3

Lake County Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 US 3 7

Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 US 682 (1949) 4

Martin v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 547 (1918) 3

Monell v. New York City Dept of Social Services (1978) 436 US 6 8

Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 9

Osborn v. Bank of the United States (22 US (9 Wheat) 738 (1824) 10

Owen v. City of Independance 445 US 622 8

Scheuer v. Rhodes,416 U.S. 233 (1974) 3

Tindale v. Wesley, 167 US 204 (1897) 4

United States v. Lee, 106 US 196 (1882) 4

Will, 491 U.S ____ 9

Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 US 33(1950) 5

Worldwide Church of God v. McNair (9th Cir 1986) 805 F.2d 888 5

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